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Over the past ten years, companies such as Uber, Etsy, Lyft, Airbnb, Care, 
and Rover have become household names by connecting service providers and 
sellers with consumers online and through app-based programs. This work 
continues to grow, along with the technology-enabled convenience of accessing goods 
and services through apps on smartphones in this new sector of the economy 
(hereinafter “On-Demand Economy”). While self-employed workers, independent 
contractors, freelancers, and contingent workers have long been present in 
America’s workforce, the proliferation of companies that connect sellers and service 
providers with customers and process payment online and via apps (hereinafter 
“On-Demand Platforms”), as well as the increasing prevalence of cashless 
transactions for work on demand, has raised important questions as to how 
efficiently our current tax collection system works. 
While existing research has focused on the size, growth trajectory, and labor 
law implications of the On-Demand Economy, as well as the tax, compliance, and 
benefits issues triggered by the rise of its workforce, less academic work has been 
devoted to quantifying the Social Security implications of the On-Demand Economy 
and its workers. Although it is not new that the self-employed present tax 
compliance and income reporting issues, the existing reporting rules applicable to 
most workers earning income working with On-Demand Platforms substantially 
increase the likelihood that these taxpayers will fail to contribute to Social Security 
and Medicare through payment of Self-Employment (SE) tax. This article sheds 
light on the Social Security implications of the current federal tax rules for the self-
employed generally, and in particular, workers earning income through occupations 
occurring in the On-Demand Economy through estimating the population and 
earnings of these workers using data from the U.S. Census Bureau redesigned 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). 
 
*  Copyright © 2019, Caroline Lewis Bruckner and Thomas Hungerford. The research reported herein was 
performed pursuant to a grant from Boston College Center for Retirement Research. A similar version of 
this work has been posted (published) by Boston College Center for Retirement Research as Working Paper 
No. 2019-1. The authors would like thank Matthew Conte, American University Class of 2019, who was a 
Technical Contributor to this work and Research Assistant to the Kogod Tax Policy Center, who provided 
research and technical edits to various drafts. In addition, we are grateful to Jen Brown, former Kogod Tax 
Policy Center Fellow, who developed the initial outline and draft of this work and conducted the original 
SIPP data analysis. We are also grateful to James R. White for providing comments on the draft and 
sharing his tax gap expertise. Finally, we very much appreciate the opportunity we had to workshop this 
draft with SIPP experts at the U.S. Census Bureau in September 2018. In particular, we appreciate the 
feedback from Robert Munk and Mark Klee. 
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By analyzing 2014 SIPP data, we are able to identify populations of (1) self-
employed, non-employer respondents working outside of a traditional employment 
relationship (hereinafter “Independent Contractors”); and (2) individuals who work 
in occupations that occur in the On-Demand Economy (hereinafter “On-Demand 
Workers”). SIPP data has the potential to capture workers earning income using 
On-Demand Platforms to connect with customers and process payment (hereinafter 
“On-Platform Workers”) as well as workers earning income in occupations occurring 
in the On-Demand Economy not using On-Demand Platforms (hereinafter “Off-
Platform Workers”). 
Additionally, with SIPP data, we can estimate the earnings that Independent 
Contractors and On-Demand Workers earned in 2014. Then, using existing Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) data on the tax gap, U.S. Treasury audit data specific to the 
underpayment of SE tax as well as survey data of tax compliance of On-Platform 
Workers and the self-employed, we are able to create an estimate of how much SE 
tax should have been paid on this income but likely was not. To provide context for 
our findings, we developed estimates on the likely underpayment of SE tax from 
data published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in 2018 on the number of 
Independent Contractors and On-Platform Workers from data published by the U.S. 
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration in 2017 and 2019. In addition, 
using SIPP, we were able to provide demographic data on Independent Contractors 
and On-Demand Workers, not typically derived from tax data. Ultimately, we found 
that: 
• According to SIPP, approximately 7.1 million individuals were Independent 
Contractors, and 3.12 million individuals were On-Demand Workers in 2014. 
• Using SIPP data, we estimate the collective earnings of Independent 
Contractors were approximately $204.1 billion 2014, while On-Demand 
Workers collectively earned approximately $35.97 billion in 2014. 
• Based on our review of SIPP data and existing measures of misreporting self-
employment income, we estimate at least 3.1 million Independent 
Contractors underreported self-employment income in 2014. This 
underreporting would result in approximately $4.84 billion in unpaid SE tax, 
with approximately $3.92 billion constituting non-payment of Social Security 
contributions. 
• Using SIPP as well as existing research on tax compliance and information 
reporting for On-Platform workers and the self-employed, we estimate that 
there is as much as $2.51 billion in unpaid SE tax by On-Demand Workers in 
2014. This discrepancy translates to approximately $2.03 billion not paid into 
Social Security in 2014. 
• In terms of demographics, using SIPP, we found that Independent 
Contractors in 2014 were most often Baby Boomers (that is, aged 55 and 
over), more likely to be women than men, and are more often White than a 
member of any other race or ethnicity. On-Demand Workers in 2014 were 
more often a member of Generation X (that is, aged 34 to 54), more likely to 
be women than men, and were most frequently White. 
 
54 Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [9:52 
• Our estimates of likely additional SE tax owed by the populations we 
identified is attributable, in part, to current information-reporting rules and 
directly undermines efforts to fund Social Security. Further, failure to 
contribute owed SE tax by these populations could translate to lower Social 
Security benefits for these workers upon retirement. While our estimates are 
illustrative rather than definitive, they are intended to highlight the 
immediate need for (1) additional research on the tax compliance of these 
workers and (2) legislative action to combat extensive underreporting of SE 
tax by these populations. 
• Since 2016, Congress, the U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury), and the 
IRS have been aware of tax compliance challenges triggered by the current 
information reporting regime with respect to the On-Demand Platform 
workers. In addition, since at least 2007, the Treasury and IRS have been 
aware of the widespread underreporting of SE taxes and its impact on the tax 
gap. With the advent of the On-Demand Economy and its workforce, these 
problems have exponentially grown notwithstanding efforts to increase tax 
compliance through additional information reporting. 
We conclude that policymakers should move forward with considering proposals 
targeted to increase tax compliance and Social Security contributions for 
Independent Contractors generally, and, in particular, for the On-Demand Economy 
workforce. We suggest that Congress can take steps to modernize information 
reporting, to update quarterly estimated payment requirements, and to require 
distribution of tax guidance to help combat underreporting of self-employment 




In the past ten years, companies like Uber, Etsy, Lyft, Airbnb, and Rover 
have become household names by connecting service providers, sellers, and 
consumers online and through app-based programs that users download to their 
smartphones (the On-Demand Economy or Gig Economy).1 The most comprehensive 
banking industry data show that, in recent years, at least 2.3 million Americans 
each month earned income by renting rooms, giving rides, running errands, and 
selling goods using an app-based platform.2 In fact, as many as 5.5 million 
 
1  CAROLINE BRUCKNER, KOGOD TAX POLICY CTR., KOGOD SCH. OF BUS., SHORTCHANGED: THE TAX COMPLIANCE 
CHALLENGES OF SMALL BUSINESS OPERATORS DRIVING THE ON-DEMAND PLATFORM ECONOMY 1 (2016), 
https://www.american.edu/kogod/research/upload/shortchanged.pdf. 
2  JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. INST., THE ONLINE PLATFORM ECONOMY IN 2018: DRIVERS, WORKERS, SELLERS, AND 
LESSORS 2–3 (2018), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/content/dam/jpmc/jpmorgan-chase-and-
co/institute/pdf/institute-ope-2018.pdf [hereinafter JPMCI 2018 STUDY]. The findings reflect data from a 
sample of 39 million Chase checking accounts that tracked payments from 128 online platforms to 2.3 
million families from October 2012 to March 2018. Id. at 2. In the study, the online platforms, which 
connect customers to sellers or service providers and mediate payment, were grouped into four categories: 
transportation (driving goods or people); non-transport (dog walking, home care, home repair, telemedicine, 
etc.); selling through an online marketplace; and leasing (renting homes, parking spaces, and other assets). 
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households earn income from the On-Demand Economy every year.3 This sector of 
the economy continues to grow, along with the convenience of accessing goods and 
services through apps on smartphones.4 In fact, the payroll industry stakeholders 
are banking on it. For example, in February 2020, the ADP Research Institute 
conducted a study that reviewed the anonymized, aggregated payroll data from 
more than 75,000 large companies with more than 18 million workers; it found that 
from 2010 to 2019 “the share of gig workers in companies has increased from 14.2% 
to 16.4%, a 2.2 percentage point increase, or 15%.”5 
Although independent contractors have been a long-standing feature of the 
U.S. workforce, paid work facilitated by online platforms that connect customers 
with sellers and service providers and process payment electronically (hereinafter 
“On-Demand Platforms”) are a common strategy for workers to earn income outside 
of traditional work arrangements, with the supplemental income being “a luxury for 
some but a necessity for others.”6 Some industry research suggests that workers are 
looking to the On-Demand Economy as a means of supplementing their retirement 
savings and to “age in place.”7 
As the use of On-Demand Platforms has grown, academic research and 
policymakers have begun to consider the tax compliance challenges and federal tax 
 
Id.; see also DIANA FARRELL & FIONA GREIG, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. INST., PAYCHECKS, PAYDAYS, AND THE 
ON-DEMAND PLATFORM ECONOMY: BIG DATA ON INCOME VOLATILITY (2016) [hereinafter JPMCI 2016 Study], 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/content/dam/jpmc/jpmorgan-chase-and-co/institute/pdf/jpmc-institute-
volatility-2-report.pdf. 
3  JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 23.  
4  Id. In fact, MBO Partners, a tax and accounting firm focused on the independent workforce that has 
produced an annual study of the size of the independent workforce since 2010, estimating that there were 
41.1 million independent workers in 2019, a slight decline from the previous year, due to a strong labor 
market and the exit of “reluctant independents” (that is, workers who would prefer traditional employment 
from independent work). MBO PARTNERS, THE STATE OF INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 2–3 (2019), 
https://s29814.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/MBO-SOI-2019.pdf [hereinafter MBO 2019 REPORT]. 
However, the study also noted the extraordinary growth of “occasional independents” (that is, workers who 
do sporadic or irregular independent contract work like Uber drivers) increased by more than 6% to more 
than 15 million (up from 14.1 million in 2018) and more than 40% since 2016. Id. at 6–7; see also 
MICROECONOMIX, THE APP ECONOMY IN THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF THE MOBILE APP MARKET AND ITS 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 19 (2018), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/08/ftc-2018-0048-d-0121-155299.pdf 
(finding that the app economy in 2018 represented $339.6 billion in direct economic impact).  
5  ADP RESEARCH INST., ILLUMINATING THE SHADOW WORKFORCE: INSIGHTS INTO THE GIG WORKFORCE IN 
BUSINESS 3 (2020), https://www.adp.com/-/media/adp/resourcehub/pdf/adpri/illuminating-the-shadow-
workforce-by-adp-research-institute.ashx. Additionally, the Freelancers Union and Upwork, as part of their 
annual series of reports on freelancing in America, found that 57 million Americans (or 35% of the 
workforce) freelanced, which was up from 53 million in 2014. Press Release, Upwork, Sixth Annual 
“Freelancing in America” Study Finds That More People than Ever See Freelancing as a Long-Term Career 
Path (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.upwork.com/press/2019/10/03/freelancing-in-america-2019/ [hereinafter 
FIA 2019 Report].  
6  Aaron Smith, Gig Work, Online Selling and Home Sharing, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 17, 2016), 
www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/17/gig-work-online-selling-and-home-sharing. 
7  AIRBNB, AIRBNB'S GROWING COMMUNITY OF 60+ WOMEN HOSTS 8–9 (2016), https://www.airbnbcitizen.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Airbnb_60_Plus_Women_Report.pdf [hereinafter AIRBNB, WOMEN HOSTS]; AIRBNB, 
AIRBNB’S GROWING ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR D.C. SENIORS 2 (2018), https://www.airbnbcitizen.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/REPORT_-Senior-Airbnb-Hosts-in-D.C.-March-2018-1.pdf [hereinafter AIRBNB, 
D.C. SENIORS] (noting the typical D.C. senior host made $10,600 renting their home to D.C. visitors). 
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policy implications of service providers and sellers earning income in the On-
Demand Economy.8 For example, in July 2018, the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Finance heard testimony indicating that the current tax rules for reporting income 
for On-Demand Economy earnings virtually ensure that more taxpayers will 
misreport their income and be exposed to audits and penalties.9 In fact, IRS 
taxpayer data confirm these consequences to a certain degree. According to a 2017 
analysis prepared by The Wall Street Journal, “the number of filers penalized for 
underpaying estimated taxes rose nearly 40% between 2010-2015—to 10 million.”10  
Not only do the tax compliance challenges of these taxpayers result in 
widespread underreporting, penalties, and audit exposure for income taxes but 
these challenges also implicate the Social Security and Medicare taxes due on self-
employment income (“SE tax”). Failure to properly report income and pay SE tax 
undermines Social Security solvency and can reduce workers’ future Social Security 
retired-worker benefits that are calculated based on a worker’s “average indexed 
monthly earnings.”11 Social Security is a “self-financing program” that is funded 
primarily by payroll taxes paid by covered workers and employers in addition to SE 
taxes paid by self-employed individuals.12  
While there is private and academic research reviewing the size, growth 
trajectory, and labor law implications of the On-Demand Economy—as well as the 
income tax, compliance, and benefits issues triggered by its workers—less emphasis 
has been placed on quantifying the SE tax and Social Security implications of the 
fact that a significant number of these taxpayers either underreport or fail to remit 
 
8  See BRUCKNER, supra note 1; see also Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 989, 989 (2016) [hereinafter Can Sharing Be Taxed?]; Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, The Tax Lives of 
Uber Drivers: Evidence from Internet Discussion Forums, COLUM. J. TAX L., 1 (2017); Kathleen DeLaney 
Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (2018); Targeted Tax Reform: Solutions to 
Relieve the Tax Compliance Burdens for America’s Small Businesses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small 
Bus. and Entrepreneurship, 114th Cong. 64–70 (2015) (statement of Caroline Bruckner Executive-in-
Residence, Accounting and Taxation and Managing Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center); The Sharing 
Economy: A Taxing Experience for New Entrepreneurs Part I: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 
114th Cong. 4–6 (2016) (statement of Caroline Bruckner), https://smallbusiness.house.gov/uploadedfiles/5-
24-16_bruckner_testimony_.pdf; [hereinafter The Sharing Economy: Part I] Small Business Tax Reform: 
Modernizing the Code for the Nation’s Job Creators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 115th 
Cong. 10–23 (2017) (statement of Caroline Bruckner, Executive-in-Residence, Accounting and Taxation and 
Managing Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center), https://smallbusiness.house.gov/uploadedfiles/10-4-
17_bruckner_testimony.pdf; Caroline Bruckner, Congress Failed to Fix Tax Woes for Gig Workers, CHI. TRIB. 
(Feb. 15, 2018, 3:00 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-gig-economy-
taxes-uber-lyft-airbnb-0216-20180215-story.html; Letter from Caroline Bruckner, Managing Dir., Kogod 
Tax Policy Ctr., to Co-Chairs of the Bipartisan Individual Income Tax Reform Working Grp. (Apr. 15, 2015) 
(on file with American University). 
9  Improving Tax Administration Today: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and IRS Oversight of the 
Comm. on Fin., 115th Cong. 29 (2018) (statement of Caroline Bruckner Executive-in-Residence, Accounting 
and Taxation and Managing Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center) [hereinafter July 2018 Senate Testimony].  
10  Laura Saunders, Number of Americans Caught Underpaying Their Taxes Surges 40%, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 
2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-numberof-americans-caught-underpayingsometaxes-
surges-40-1502443801.  
11  BARRY F. HUSTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42035, SOCIAL SECURITY PRIMER 8 (2020); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 131–40.  
12  See HUSTON, supra note 11, at 1. 
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Social Security contributions.13 The failure to consider these implications matters 
because “the most fundamental shortcoming of the current [U.S. retirement] system 
is that millions of working Americans have no easy way to save for retirement on 
the job outside of Social Security.”14 
This Article provides new insight on the Social Security implications of On-
Demand Economy work using the U.S. Census Bureau’s (Census) redesigned Survey 
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)15 to estimate the populations and 
earnings of self-employed, non-employer workers working outside of a traditional 
employment relationship (Independent Contractors),16 as well as individuals 
working in occupations that occur in the On-Demand Economy (On-Demand 
Workers).17  
 
13  However, there has been some important work on On-Demand Workers’ income insecurity, Social Security 
and retirement issues. See Janine Berg, Income Security in the On-Demand Economy: Findings and Policy 
Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 543, 544 (2016); Paul M. Secunda, 
Uber Retirement, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 435, 436–37 (2017). More recently, in 2019, the U.S. Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration published the results of an audit finding that underreporting of 
SE tax of On-Platform gig workers in recent years warrants a focus on SE tax compliance. TREASURY 
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., EXPANSION OF THE GIG ECONOMY WARRANTS FOCUS ON IMPROVING SELF-
EMPLOYMENT TAX COMPLIANCE 1 (2019); see also Caroline Bruckner & Annette Nellen, Failure to Innovate: 
Tax Compliance and the Gig Economy Workforce, 96 ST. TAX NOTES 485, 486 (2019). 
14  DAVID S. MITCHELL, ASPEN INST. FIN. SEC. PROGRAM, BUILDING A MORE ROBUST AND INCLUSIVE U.S. 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM AMID A CHANGING ECONOMY 4 (2017). 
15  Data on business ownership and individual earnings can be obtained through a number of Census products. 
See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2015 SIPP PRODUCTION: SIPP PUBLIC USE METADATA REPORT (2018) 
[hereinafter 2015 SIPP PRODUCTION]. One of the main surveys to measure this data is SIPP, which is 
conducted in a series of national panels, with sample sizes ranging from approximately 14,000 to 36,700 
interviewed households. The duration of each panel lasts one year. SIPP is the third-largest household 
survey administered by Census, focused on providing accurate and comprehensive information about the 
income and program participation of individuals and households in the United States. The re-engineered 
2014 SIPP survey provides a unique analysis that other instruments do not capture. Specifically, it 
measures self-employment and participation in concurrent employment measured by industry and 
occupation. Additionally, it provides analysis on the amount of income derived from each type of 
employment. Because of this unique ability, SIPP provides a foundation to estimate the number of self-
employed individuals, the number of self-employed individuals in particular industries and occupations, 
and the amount of income that these individuals derive from these types of employment. As with any 
survey, there are some limitations with these estimates. The data is self-reported, meaning that individuals 
can incorrectly report their self-employment status, their occupation or industry, and the amount of income 
that they derived from these employment relationships.  
16  Using SIPP data, we define “Independent Contractors” as respondents who stated that they were self-
employed with no employees, owned their own business instead of being employed by another employer, or 
were in an “other work arrangement” for their type of work arrangement. Id. at 1451–57. This definition 
excludes individuals employed by an employer or in an “other work arrangement, with no employees, in 
specified occupations.” Id. 
17  Using SIPP data, we define “On-Demand Workers” as individuals employed by an employer or in an “other 
work arrangement, with no employees, in specified occupations including babysitting and child care 
services; dog walking; house sitting; disabled adult or eldercare services; house cleaning; house painting; 
yard work; property maintenance work; other personal services work such as running errands or helping 
people move; jewelers; or driving. Dummy variable created by merging EJB1_JBORSE through 
EJB7_JBORSE, variables TJB1_EMPB through TJB7_EMPB, and selected occupations in TJB1_OCC 
through TJB7_OCC in the 2014 Panel Wave 2 Metadata. Id. at 1451–57, 1689–95, 1570–1642. One of the 
limitations of using SIPP data is that this definition is too broad in that it could include employees of 
employers. In addition, the Census SIPP experts we consulted in indicated this definition could include 
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SIPP data can supplement other existing government data sets for federal 
tax policy purposes because of the large number of individuals surveyed, reporting 
of earnings, and collection of demographic information. In addition, SIPP has the 
ability to capture individuals not otherwise represented in other government 
surveys and instruments of On-Demand Economy workers because SIPP is able to 
measure multiple on-demand and independent contract arrangements. SIPP data 
has the potential to capture non-employee workers earning income using On-
Demand Platforms to connect with customers and process payment (“On-Platform 
Workers”) as well as non-employee workers earning income in occupations occurring 
in the On-Demand Economy not using On-Demand Platforms (“Off-Platform 
Workers”). Most importantly for purposes of this project, SIPP provides data to 
enable us to estimate the amount of income derived from these work 
arrangements.18  
However, SIPP does have its limitations, and the estimates in this Article are 
supplemental, illustrative estimates designed to add to the existing literature on 
the Social Security implications of the tax compliance of these self-employed 
workers.19 For example, the SIPP data on self-employment do not specifically 
identify individuals who earn income working with On-Demand Platforms. To 
address this limitation, we have identified individuals with occupations occurring in 
the On-Demand Economy as reflected by their SIPP responses. As such, our 
estimates of On-Demand Workers include both On-Platform Workers and Off-
Platform Workers, a population that is likely larger than the On-Demand Platform 
workforce.20 In addition, our estimates on the earnings of both populations are not 
necessarily the net of expenses and are understatements of the collective earnings 
 
individuals who identified as employees, despite the fact they were actually independent contractors. In 
addition, this definition is too narrow in that it does not include occupations occurring in the On-Demand 
Economy such as renting rooms, cars, or other assets.  
18  A more in-depth discussion of the advantages of SIPP to supplement other government surveys is discussed 
in the Methodology section. See infra pp. 90–93.  
19  As with any survey, there are some limitations that will impact the estimates we calculated using SIPP 
data. The data is self-reported, meaning that individuals can incorrectly report their self-employment 
status, their occupation or industry, and the amount of income that they derived from these employment 
relationships. SIPP has its advantages over other estimates because it can capture respondents’ data on 
multiple employment points and is not limited to questions on an individual’s main job or primary source of 
income. See infra pp. 90–93. 
20  We recognize that the criteria we used to identify Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers to 
extrapolate earnings and demographic data from the SIPP are imprecise measures of the total population of 
these self-employed workers. For example, the Census SIPP experts we consulted in connection with this 
work indicated that while our estimates on the population of On-Demand Workers were potentially over-
inclusive, the measures we used to extrapolate the collective earnings of Independent Contractors and On-
Demand Workers were too conservative. In order to provide additional context for our estimates using SIPP 
data, we included additional estimates using the most recent data on alternative contingent workers and 
gig-economy workers available from the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the 
JPMCI 2018 Study, and the 2019 TIGTA Audit. See infra Table 3.  
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of the populations of Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers we 
identified using SIPP.21 
Notwithstanding these data limitations, this Article expands the existing 
research on the SE tax compliance of Independent Contractors and On-Demand 
Workers by focusing on the Social Security implications of the failure of these 
taxpayers to accurately report income and pay SE taxes on this income. It also 
considers corresponding demographic data with respect to these populations of 
workers and makes critical policy recommendations regarding Independent 
Contractor tax compliance generally and, more specifically, On-Demand Workers to 
address the SE tax underreporting we estimate.  
Part I summarizes the relevant SE tax, filing, and information reporting 
rules as well as the corresponding tax compliance issues of both Independent 
Contractors and On-Demand Workers. Part II introduces the existing challenges of 
measuring independent and On-Demand Economy workers and provides estimates 
on Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers to supplement the existing 
literature using SIPP data. Part III, relying on SIPP data, estimates how much 
income Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers earned in 2014. 
Part IV approximates the amount of SE taxes that should have been paid on 
this income and estimates the Social Security underpayment amount using 
information from the U.S. Treasury’s Inspector General for Tax Administration’s 
analysis of underreporting of SE taxes and information gained from research on On-
Demand Platforms and the IRS about issuance of tax reporting forms. Part V 
examines the demographic makeup of Independent Contractors and On-Demand 
Workers, estimates the impact of failing to report self-employed income on Social 
Security in 2014, and discusses the potential long-term implications. Finally, Part 
VI makes critical policy recommendations targeted to increase the tax compliance of 
Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers by modernizing information 
reporting, updating timing requirements for estimated payments, and developing 
distribution information on the tax requirements for Independent Contractors and 
On-Demand Economy workers on the payment of SE taxes. 
 
I. BACKGROUND ON TAX AND REPORTING RULES FOR INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTORS AND ON-DEMAND WORKERS 
 
The U.S. tax system is a pay-as-you-go system of tax collection. Since World 
War II, employees have had a portion of their wages withheld by their employers 
and remitted to the IRS in anticipation of an employee’s annual income and payroll 
 
21  According to the Census SIPP experts we consulted, the earnings variables we used understated the total 
amount of earnings of Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers because we only included 
earnings for people who reported gross total amounts that they actually received during the year. Some 
SIPP respondents included in our Independent Contractor and On-Demand Worker populations may have 
reported their earnings another way (such as their average monthly or bi-weekly income, for example), and 
the measure we used would not include their earnings at all. See supra note 20 discussion. 
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tax liability, such as Social Security and Medicare.22 Employee tax withholding was 
originally enacted as a means to raise revenue to fund increased government 
operations during wartime and was designed to “smooth [employees’] after-tax 
income throughout the year and facilitate[] revenue collection by the IRS.”23  
However, Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers are not 
generally treated as employees for U.S. tax purposes. Instead, they are treated as 
self-employed with respect to their earnings.24 Under current tax rules, self-
employed workers are typically not subject to employer income and payroll tax 
withholding. Instead, Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers are 
required to make estimated income tax payments to federal and state tax collection 
agencies for federal and state income taxes and, when annual net earnings are at 
least $400, 15.3% in self-employment tax.25 
The absence of withholding leads to the underreporting of taxes by a 
significant number of self-employed taxpayers, who have “different pain points than 
their employee counterparts with respect to their tax filings.”26 Government and 
academic research on the tax compliance of the self-employed reflect these 
challenges, and “there is a large literature showing that this group consistently and 
substantially underreports their income to . . . tax authorities.”27 A 2018 tax 
preparer industry survey found that 32% of self-employed workers admitted to 
 
22  Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: 
The “Independent Worker,” HAMILTON PROJECT 18 (2015), 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_kruege
r_harris.pdf. 
23  Id. 
24  For background information on worker classification and its relevance to On-Demand Workers and U.S. tax 
rules, see Annette Nellen, Caroline Bruckner & Jennifer Brown, Taxes and the Growing Gig Workforce: 
What to Know, 128 J. TAX’N 6, 8, 15 (2018). A primary reason for why policymakers, tax and labor experts, 
and On-Demand Platforms have been slow to tackle the simmering tax and compliance issues underlying 
the On-Demand Economy is the looming question of whether workers who provide services to customers via 
On-Demand Platforms are misclassified employees. Misclassification issues have long stymied 
Congressional efforts to address tax and benefits issues of self-employed workers. Rarely have policymakers 
been able to reach consensus on strategies to address worker misclassification for either tax or labor law 
purposes. With the advent of the tech-enabled On-Demand Economy and the at least 2.3 million taxpayers 
now earning income selling goods and services through On-Demand Platforms every month, Congressional 
action to address tax compliance challenges of these taxpayers should be the top priority, separate and 
apart from resolving any corresponding worker misclassification issues. See Caroline Bruckner, Response to 
Questions for the Record in Connection with U.S. Senate Committee on Finance Subcommittee on Taxation 
and IRS Oversight July Hearing (Sept. 19, 2018) (responding to question from Sen. Thune as to whether 
resolving misclassification of on-demand workers should be a legislative priority) (unpublished) (on file with 
author). 
25  Financing of the Social Security program is authorized by the revenue collected pursuant to: (1) the Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), which applies to employers and employees, and (2) the Self-
Employment Contributions Act, which applies to self-employment income. HUSTON, supra note 11, at 3.  
26  BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 9, 15. 
27  Erik Hurst, Geng Li & Benjamin Pugsley, Are Household Surveys like Tax Forms: Evidence from Income 
Underreporting of the Self Employed 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16527, 2010) 
(finding that the self-employed underreport their income on household surveys by 30%). 
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underreporting their income for tax purposes and that 36% “d[id]n’t do taxes at 
all.”28  
The amount and timing requirements of quarterly estimated payments and 
the information reporting regime for On-Demand Platform work, create tax 
compliance challenges for SE taxes that often trigger non-filing, underpayment,  
and nonpayment of taxes—in many cases, unwittingly by taxpayers who are 
unfamiliar with paying taxes on self-employment income.29 In fact, anecdotal 
evidence from tax preparers advising Independent Contractors and On-Demand 
Workers suggests that while these taxpayers are generally aware that they may 
owe income taxes on their earnings, many are surprised to learn they owe SE taxes, 
too.30 
 
A. Self-Employment Tax 
 
Unlike traditional employees who are subject to payroll taxes and 
withholding by employers that also pay a portion of employees’ payroll taxes, 
taxpayers with self-employment income pay the combined employee and employer 
share of Social Security and Medicare taxes pursuant to the Self-Employment 
Contributions Act (SECA).31 Any taxpayer with net earnings of four hundred dollars 
or more of self-employment income is required to pay SE tax and file a Schedule 
SE.32 While self-employed taxpayers pay the combined employer and employee 
share of Social Security and Medicare taxes, they are allowed a deduction of one-
half of their total SE tax paid for federal income tax purposes.33 
When SE tax is combined with federal income tax, it can add up quickly for 
Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers and can create significant tax 
compliance issues.34 For example, in a 2015 survey on the tax compliance 
 
28  32% of Self-Employed Workers Admit They Under Report Taxable Income, CPA PRAC. ADVISOR (Apr. 24, 
2018), https://www.cpapracticeadvisor.com/news/12409241/32-of-self-employed-workers-admit-they-under-
report-taxable-income. Of the 36% of respondents who did not pay taxes at all, 9% admitted to not having a 
reason, 17% claimed to not make enough to owe taxes, and the remaining 10% answered they had losses 
that exceeded their profits. Id. 
29  BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 9–11. 
30  Id. 
31  HUSTON, supra note 11, at 3. Specifically, employees and employers each pay 6.2% Social Security tax on up 
to $137,700 of earnings in 2020 and an additional 1.45% Medicare tax on all earnings (i.e., the two 
components add up to 7.65% in tax paid by employees and then 7.65% paid by employers). Id. For self-
employed taxpayers it would be 12.4% in Social Security tax on up to $137,700 on net earnings and 2.9% in 
Medicare tax on their entire net earnings, which is 15.3% cumulatively. 
32  Self-Employment Tax (Social Security and Medicare Taxes), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/self-employment-tax-social-security-and-
medicare-taxes (last updated Nov. 25, 2020). 
33  Id. 
34  See BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 11–12. However, with respect to On-Demand Workers who earn income 
from home-sharing or real property rental activities, the tax reporting rules are more complicated. For 
example, many individuals with rental income report that income and those expenses on a Schedule E and 
are not subject to SE tax on that income; however, certain real estate professionals who earn rental income 
may be required to file a Schedule C and are subject to SE tax. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG LLP, GENERAL 
GUIDANCE ON THE TAXATION OF INCOME 16 (2017), https://assets.airbnb.com/eyguidance/us.pdf.  
 
62 Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [9:52 
challenges of On-Platform Workers, almost forty-three percent of surveyed 
respondents did not set aside any money and were not aware of how much they 
would owe on income earned from working with an On-Demand Platform as a 
service provider or seller.35 
 
B. Quarterly-Estimated Payments 
 
In addition to the confusion surrounding the amount of income and SE tax 
owed by taxpayers with self-employment income, the timing of when to pay 
presents additional certainty.36 Under current tax rules, when self-employed 
taxpayers are expected to owe at least $1,000 in taxes and are not subject to 
withholding, advance payments of estimated tax are due to the IRS in quarterly 
installments.37 These payments are due on April 15, June 15, September 15, and 
January 15 and are referred to as quarterly-estimated payments.38  
“In calculating whether a taxpayer needs to make quarterly-estimated 
payments throughout the year, taxpayers need to include both income taxes and 
self-employment taxes owed—minus any refundable credits—”on any income not 
subject to withholding.39 Added together, income tax and SE tax liabilities for 
Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers can quickly reach the $1,000 
threshold for triggering quarterly-estimated payments. For example, a ridesharing 
driver who earns $7,500 driving part-time for an On-Demand Platform and earns no 
other income would have an SE tax liability of $1,060 triggering a required filing of 
estimate payments even if no income tax is owed.40 
Moreover, survey data suggest that many taxpayers are unaware of the 
requirements of quarterly-estimated payments. For example, a 2015 survey of 
experienced SE taxpayers found that one-third of survey respondents earning 
income in the On-Demand Economy reported not knowing whether or not they were 
required to file quarterly estimated payments with the IRS.41 
  
 
35  BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 10. 
36  Id. 
37  I.R.C. § 6654 (2018). 
38  Id. For 2020, the U.S. Department of Treasury and IRS extended some tax due dates in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Extends More Tax Deadlines to 
Cover Individuals, Trusts, Estates Corporations and Others (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-extends-more-tax-deadlines-to-cover-individuals-trusts-estates-
corporations-and-others.  
39  BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 10; see I.R.S. Form 1040-ES, (2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040es.pdf. 
40  Nellen et al., supra note 24, at 15.  
41  BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 11.  
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C. Information Reporting Requirements 
 
Lack of information and understanding of what is required for tax compliance 
purposes is a common complaint among SE taxpayers.42 In terms of calculating 
taxes and reconciling income, employees who have income and payroll taxes 
withheld and remitted to the IRS by their employers receive an IRS Form W-2 from 
their employers to use to fill out their tax returns in April.43 In contrast, SE 
taxpayers who pay income and SE taxes via quarterly-estimated payments are 
subject to a separate set of information reporting rules and forms for non-employee 
compensation (for example, IRS Forms 1099) that are reported to the IRS by payors 
and third-party settlement organizations (“TPSO”).44 However, On-Demand 
Workers who are On-Platform Workers are not as likely to have their income 
reported to the IRS.45 Under the current tax reporting rules for income of On-
Platform Workers, it is unlikely that these workers will receive any Form 1099 to 
file their taxes.46  
Generally, SE workers are supposed to receive a Form 1099-MISC for 
payments by businesses for more than $600 for goods or services that they 
provide.47 However, if an SE worker receives payments from customers via an On-
Demand Platform, then the IRS generally considers the On-Demand Platform to be 
a TPSO for tax reporting purposes.48 This matters because TPSOs are not required 
to file a Form 1099-K with the IRS or send a copy to a service provider or seller 
unless the aggregate number of transactions of a service provider or seller exceeds 
two hundred and the amount reported exceeds twenty thousand dollars (“200/$20K 
Form 1099-K Threshold”).49  
Most On-Demand Platforms use the 200/$20K Form 1099-K Threshold for 
providing Form 1099-Ks to service providers and sellers, which is consistent with 
IRS filing requirements, rather than the $600 Form 1099-MISC threshold.50 While 
adopting the higher threshold is consistent with current IRS reporting 
requirements, it results in fewer Form 1099-Ks being sent to workers and the IRS 
because most On-Platform Workers do not earn more than $20,000 to trigger the 
 
42  See id. at 12 (noting that more than one-third of survey respondents did not understand record-keeping 
requirements for tax purposes). 
43  Internal Revenue Serv., About Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-
form-w-2 (last updated Oct. 29, 2020). 
44  BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 9. 
45  See id. 
46  See id. at 10. 
47  I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2018). 
48  See I.R.S. P.L.R. 201604003 (Jan. 22, 2016); I.R.S. P.L.R. 201619006 (May 6, 2016); I.R.S. P.L.R. 201719009 
(May 12, 2017); I.R.S. P.L.R. 201836008 (Sept. 7, 2018). 
49  I.R.C. § 6050W (2018). 
50  See July 2018 Senate Testimony, supra note 9 (noting that most platforms do not send 1099-Ks for earnings 
unless the 200/$20K Form1099-K Threshold is met). 
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threshold.51 A survey found that as few as thirty-two percent of On-Platform 
Workers received a Form 1099-MISC or Form 1099-K in 2015.52 
In 2019, an analysis prepared by the State of California’s Franchise Tax 
Board (“California Tax Analysis”) revealed that of the top 100 On-Demand 
Platforms in 2016, only twelve percent issued Form 1099-Ks to service providers 
and, of those twelve percent, only half issued more than fifty-five.53 The California 
Tax Analysis also indicated widespread tax compliance issues of gig workers, noting 
that gig workers may not know how much they earned, what income must be 
reported, how to report gig income, or any offsets they could claim to lower tax 
liabilities.54 More broadly, the California Tax Analysis reflects the underlying 
reality of the impact of the current information reporting rules for On-Demand 
Platform workers: the majority of sellers and service providers earning income 
doing On-Platform work do not receive any Form 1099-K, which means the IRS does 
not either.55  
Consequently, efforts to quantify the population of Independent Contractors 
and, specifically, the On-Demand Platform workforce using information reporting 
filings (such as Forms 1099) can be particularly challenging.56 In fact, some experts 
have concluded that although the Form 1099-K has been used since 2011 to report 
settlement of payment card transactions or settlement of third-party network 
transactions, it is “relatively unusual” for self-employed individuals to receive a 
Form 1099-K and “most are not issued to unincorporated self-employed 
individuals.”57 Nonetheless, while self-employment earnings may (or may not be) 
subject to information reporting, taxpayers who earn income for services provided 
are expected to report those payments on Schedule C of their Form 1040, “even if 
the individual received no information returns in connection with their taxable 
 
51  Id.; see also BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 9. 
52  BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 10. 
53  CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., GIG ECONOMY AND TAX COMPLIANCE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 14 (2019), 
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/about-ftb/meetings/board-meetings/2019/october-01/gig-economy-and-tax-
compliance.pdf. 
54  Id. at 16. 
55  July 2018 Senate Testimony, supra note 9. 
56  See Emilie Jackson, Adam Looney & Shanthi Ramnath, The Rise of Alternative Work Arrangements: 
Evidence and Implications for Tax Filing and Benefit Coverage (2018), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/about/about-the 
bureau/adrm/FESAC/meetings/Ramnath%20Presentation.pdf (reviewing the findings from their 2017 paper 
of the same name and noting that a “large fraction of people with SE income did not receive a 1099-MISC,” 
and “very few people receive a 1099-K”); see also Letter from the U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury to Sen. Mark 
Warner (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/worker-classification/treasury-
suggests-how-senator-can-gauge-size-demand-economy/2015/11/18/g024?highlight%E2%80%A6 (explaining 
why publicly available taxpayer filings “do[] not provide a good measure of contingent workforce or 
independent contractor income, let alone the on-demand economy”). 
57  Katherine G. Abraham, John C. Haltiwanger, Kristin Sandusky & James R. Spletzer, Measuring the Gig 
Economy: Current Knowledge and Open Issues (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24950, 
2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24950.pdf. 
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earnings and even if their business expenses fully offset the gross payments 
received.”58 
However, even when On-Platform Workers receive a Form 1099-K, tax 
compliance is not guaranteed. For example, the 2019 Treasury Inspector General 
for Tax Administration (TIGTA) Audit considered the tax compliance rates of 3.8 
million workers who actually received Form 1099-Ks from one of nine specific On-
Demand Platforms that processed payment for gig workers from 2012 to 2016.59 
Ultimately, the 2019 TIGTA Audit found that 812,018 individuals (25%) filed a 
Form 1040 but did not report their Form 1099-K income on either Schedule C or 
line 21 (other income) of their Form 1040.60 Also, 13% of individuals with an SE tax 
liability who received a Form 1099-K failed to file a Schedule SE with their Form 
1040.61 
 
II. SIZING UP THE PROBLEM: ESTIMATES ON THE SIZE OF THE INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR AND ON-DEMAND WORKFORCE 
 
While there is consensus that self-employed taxpayers have tax compliance 
and underreporting issues, the size of the population of independent workers and 
the On-Demand Economy workforce has been the subject of much debate in recent 
years. The fundamental problem is that “different data sources provide different 
answers to the simple question of what is the level and trend of self-employment in 
the U.S. economy.”62 In addition, “although traditional (offline) informal paid work 
has always been part of the labor sector, the rise of online enabled paid work 
activities requires new approaches to measure this growing trend.”63 Put simply, 
measuring workers with self-employment income subject to SE tax—including both 
On-Platform and Off-Platform workers—can be challenging. 
 
A. Government Efforts to Measure Independent Contractors and On-Demand 
Workers 
 
Even if government initiatives have endeavored to measure the population 
and earnings of Independent Contractors or On-Demand Platform Workers, there 
are practical impediments that can skew results, such as definitional challenges or 
 
58  Id. 
59  TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., EXPANSIONS OF THE GIG ECONOMY WARRANTS FOCUS ON 
IMPROVING SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX COMPLIANCE 7 fig. 1 (2019), 
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2019reports/201930016fr.pdf [hereinafter 2019 TIGTA AUDIT]. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. 
62  Abraham et al., supra note 57, at 15.  
63  Barbara Robles & Marysol McGee, Exploring Online and Offline Informal Work: Findings from the 
Enterprising and Informal Work Activities (EIWA) Survey 1 (Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series Divs. of 
Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Working Paper No. 2016-089 2016), 
https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.089. The EIWA Survey defined on-demand works as “task-for-fee work, 
renting and selling used items, and other informal work activities among households both online and 
offline.” Id. at 3. 
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the kind of data used.64 For example, a comprehensive U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) analysis of the state of measuring contingent work 
illustrated the difficulty in measuring these populations because estimates “can 
range from less than 5 percent to more than a third of the total employed labor 
force, depending on the definition of contingent work and the data source.”65  
A 2017 analysis of administrative tax records from the U.S. Treasury’s Office 
of Tax Analysis (OTA) found that, in 2014, only a small group—109,700 
individuals—filed a tax return reporting income earned from an On-Demand 
Platform.66 OTA also acknowledged, however, that the total count of gig workers 
was: 
[L]ikely to be an undercount of the true number of individuals that 
participated in the “gig economy” because some participants may not 
have filed a return or not filed a Schedule C reporting that income; 
because some platforms firms do not provide 1099s to all of their 
participants; and also because not all prominent service providers 
could not be found in the data . . . .67  
In 2019, the IRS Statistics of Income Joint Statistical Research Program 
released new findings based on information returns, which found that from 2000 to 
2016, workers who received Forms 1099 (including both IRS Form 1099-K and IRS 
Form 1099-MISC) grew by 1.9% and accounted for 11.8% of the current workforce.68 
In addition, almost all of the “dramatic growth” of this workforce since 2007 was 
attributable to workers using online platforms to connect with customers and 
service providers.69 It should be noted that online labor gig work is a trend that was 
“virtually non-existent” prior to 2012, but, in 2016, 1.9 million workers had some 
online platform earnings.70 Markedly, the study found that only one-third of On-
Platform Workers paid SE tax, so the data excluded “the majority of participants in 
this part of the ‘gig’ economy.”71  
Tax data is not the only source for measuring the gig economy workforce. In 
2018, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”) released the results of its 2017 
survey of alternative contingent workers (“ACW”), which found that 6.9% of the 
 
64  See, e.g., Emilie Jackson, Adam Looney & Shanthi Ramnath, The Rise of Alternative Work Arrangements: 
Evidence and Implications for Tax Filing and Benefit Coverage 6 (Office of Tax Analysis, Working Paper No. 
114, 2017).  
65  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-168R, CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS, 
EARNINGS, AND BENEFITS 3 (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669899.pdf [hereinafter GAO]. 
66  Jackson et al., supra note 64, at 18.  
67  Id. at 15. The IRS developed the Form 1099-K for submission by payers starting in 2012 for reportable 
payments made in 2011. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE IS 
UNDERUTILIZING FORM 1099-K DATA TO IDENTIFY TAX RETURNS FOR AUDIT 1 (2017).  
68  Brett Collins, Andrew Garin, Emilie Jackson, Dmitri Koustas & Mark Payne, Is Gig Work Replacing 
Traditional Employment? Evidence from Two Decades of Tax Returns 3 (Internal Revenue Serv. 2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/19rpgigworkreplacingtraditionalemployment.pdf. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. at 11. 
71  Id. at 21.  
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workforce (approximately 10.6 million individuals) were independent contractors, a 
number that remained virtually unchanged since 2005 when the survey was last 
administered.72  
Importantly, this measure applied only where an alternative or contingent 
work arrangement was a person’s “sole or main job” and, therefore, excluded the 
majority of On-Platform workers who provide services and goods as a secondary, 
rather than primary, source of income.73 In an effort to capture this population, in 
September 2018, BLS released the Contingent Worker Supplement (“CWS”) to the 
Current Population Survey (“CPS”), which included four questions designed to 
specifically gauge “gig economy” participation through electronically mediated work. 
The BLS found that, in May 2017, approximately 1.6 million workers did work for 
an On-Demand Platform.74 Notably, the 2017 BLS Gig Economy Supplement 
measured far fewer On-Demand Platform workers than other, more expansive 
studies had counted.75 Also, BLS indicated that the questions used to measure gig 
workers did not work as intended and that, going forward, “BLS should not again 
attempt to collect data about electronically mediated work using the four new 
questions fielded in the May 2017 CWS.”76 
 
B. Non-Government Measures of On-Demand Platform Workforce 
 
There are also various nongovernment and private sector surveys, estimates, 
and projections on the size and scope of independent workers. Results from these 
surveys, estimates, or projections are dependent on how “independent contractor” is 
defined. For example, in 2016, the McKinsey Global Institute found that 
approximately twenty seven percent of the workforce (sixty-eight million 
individuals) was engaged in independent contract work.77 That same study also 
found that at least “15 percent of the independent workers [it] surveyed have used a 
digital platform to find work, but the so-called on-demand economy is growing 
rapidly.”78 Other private sector surveys have found comparably large contingencies 
 
72  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, USDL-18-0942, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT 
ARRANGEMENTS—MAY 2017 6 (June 7, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conemp.pdf [hereinafter 
BLS ACW 2017 SURVEY] (finding independent contractor workforce decreased by 0.5% from 2005 to 2017). 
The 2017 BLS ACW Survey also identified 2.6 million on-call workers, 1.4 million temporary help agency 
workers, and 933,000 contract workers. Id. at 1.  
73  Id.; JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 5. 
74  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Electronically Mediated Work: New Questions in the Contingent Worker 
Supplement, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 2018, at 1–2, 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2018/article/pdf/electronically-mediated-work-new-questions-in-the-
contingent-worker-supplement.pdf [hereinafter 2017 BLS Gig Economy Supplement]. 
75  Compare id. at 13, 19, with, e.g., JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 2. 
76  2017 BLS Gig Economy Supplement, supra note 74, at 14, 24. 





78  Id. 
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of independent contractors. For example, Upwork and the Freelancer’s Union 
conducted a survey in 2019 that found that 35% of the workforce (approximately 
fifty-seven million individuals) was employed as independent contractors.79 In 2019, 
MBO Partners, in their annual survey of the independent workforce, found that 
41.1 million individuals were independent contractors.80  
In terms of measuring the On-Demand Economy specifically, a 2015 survey 
developed by the Aspen Institute, Time, and Burston-Marsteller, and conducted by 
Penn Schoen Berland, found that approximately twenty-two percent of American 
adults (forty-five million individuals) have participated in the On-Demand Economy 
as a worker.81 In 2016, the former Chief Economist at the U.S. Department of 
Labor, Lawrence Katz, and former Chair of the White House Counsel of Economic 
Advisors under President Obama, Alan Krueger, published a paper estimating that 
0.5% of all workers participated in the On-Demand Economy.82   
Importantly, in September 2018, J.P. Morgan Chase Institute (“JPMCI”) 
updated its landmark 2016 study on the On-Demand Economy, concluding that 2.3 
million families with Chase checking accounts engage in On-Platform work every 
month and that 5.5 million households have income from On-Platform work every 
year.83 The JPMCI 2018 Study is particularly important and serves as a benchmark 
for measuring On-Platform work participation; both because it relies on actual 
income flowing into On-Platform Workers bank accounts (as opposed to survey 
responses or tax filings) and because it includes data from 2012 through 2018—a 
period of extraordinary growth for this sector.84 
 
C. SIPP Data Measuring Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers 
 
Although not as robust as the JPMCI 2018 Study, SIPP data can provide 
significant insight into the population of self-employed workers. For example, using 
SIPP data, we found that 7.1 million respondents identified as self-employed small 
businesses with no employees, which we defined as Independent Contractors.85 We 
further identified 3.12 million On-Demand Workers participating in occupations 
occurring in the On-Demand Economy, which would include both On-Platform and 
Off-Platform work.86  
 
79  FIA 2019 Report, supra note 5.  
80  MBO 2019 REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.  
81  Catherine Sullivan, Forty-Five Million Americans Say They Have Worked in the On-Demand Economy, 
While 86.5 Million Have Used It, According to New Survey, ASPEN INST. (Jan. 6, 2016), 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/news/2016/01/06/forty-five-million-americans-say-they-have-worked-demand-
economy-while-865-million. 
82  Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the United 
States, 1995-2015, 72 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 382, 383 (2019). Notably, this paper did not include 
accommodation sharing (e.g., Airbnb hosts), which are included in other major studies. Compare id., with 
JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, and BLS ACW 2017 SURVEY, supra note 72. 
83  JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 6.  
84  See id. 
85  See supra notes 16–19 discussion and accompanying text.  
86  Id.  
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However, our results are not entirely consistent with the findings of the 
JPMCI 2018 Study, which looked at thirty-nine million bank accounts with deposits 
from 128 On-Demand Platforms.87 For example, SIPP did not specifically track 
electronically mediated or On-Platform work, so our estimates rely on 
approximations of occupations occurring in the On-Demand Economy. In addition, 
the SIPP data we used to measure On-Demand Workers did not include occupations 
in the leasing of assets and generating rental income, which were included in the 
JPMCI 2018 Study.88 
Our review of SIPP data finds that Independent Contractors and On-Demand 
Workers combined represented approximately 10.22 million workers. To provide 
context for this finding, consider that the 2017 BLS ACW Survey identified 10.6 
million workers as independent contractors, and another 1.6 million working as On-
Platform Workers.89 
 
III. EARNINGS OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS AND ON-DEMAND WORKERS 
 
Similar to the discrepancies and disparities in the government and private 
measurement of the size of the independent contract and on-demand workforce, 
there is little consensus on the average or median amounts of income earned by 
these groups of workers. However, the work that has been done consistently 
suggests that, in general, independent contractors earn more income than On-
Platform workers. 
 
A. Private Sector Estimates of Earnings of On-Demand Workforce 
 
In 2019, MBO Partners found that the average income for full-time 
independent contractors was $68,300 and that almost 20% of full-time independent 
contractors made more than $100,000.90 Additionally, the Upwork and the 
Freelancers Union found that in 2019, freelancers (i.e., independent workers) 
contributed almost 5% to the U.S. gross domestic product, or $1 trillion.91  
In terms of earnings of On-Platform Workers, the JPMCI 2018 Study found 
that “platform earnings represent a major source of income for families during the 
months they participate in the On-Demand Economy, but just 20 percent of income 
among those who have participated at any point over the prior year.”92 This 
research suggests that On-Platform Workers, unlike Independent Contractors, do 
not typically do On-Platform work for their sole-source of income and that most 
participants “are active in just a few months out of the year.”93  
 
87  JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 2. 
88  Id. 
89  BLS ACW 2017 SURVEY, supra note 72, at 1.  
90  MBO 2019 REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.  
91  FIA 2019 Report, supra note 5.  
92  JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 7.  
93  Id. at 6. 
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Average monthly earnings for On-Platform Workers ranged from $608 
(selling goods) to $1,736 (leasing assets), with the majority of these workers earning 
monthly income averaging $783 (providing transportation services).94 This cycling 
in and out of the On-Platform work or “churn” means that income from this work 
varies wildly every month.  As a result, annualizing the monthly earnings on On-
Platform Workers is not an accurate measure of these workers’ annual earnings. 
 
B. SIPP Estimates of Independent Contractor and On-Demand Worker 
Earnings 
 
SIPP provides additional insight into the collective earnings of Independent 
Contractors and On-Demand Workers, which, in turn, can provide further insight 
as to the Social Security implications for these populations. Using data from SIPP, 
we found that individuals who were Independent Contractors reported that they 
collectively earned approximately $204.1 billion in income in 2014 from these 
employment relationships. On-Demand Workers collectively earned approximately 
$35.97 billion in income from these employment relationships in 2014.95 Although 
our population estimates of On-Demand Workers may be over inclusive, our 
estimates of their earnings are certainly conservative and likely an underestimate 
of the collective earnings of On-Demand Workers. That noted, these estimates, 
while not an approximation for taxable income, can be used to gauge the 
underpayment of SE tax and Social Security contributions of these populations. 
 
IV. ESTIMATES OF UNDERREPORTED SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
COLLECTED FROM INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS & ON-DEMAND WORKERS 
 
Our ability to extrapolate from SIPP the number and earnings of 
Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers is foundational to our estimate 
of the corresponding SE tax underpayment by these taxpayers and our ability to 
translate those amounts to Social Security contributions. By utilizing 
underreporting estimates derived from government research and tax gap analysis, 
prior work on tax compliance specific to SE taxes, and likely misreporting of income 
due to current information reporting rules, we are able to approximate an estimate 
of the amount of underreported SE tax on the earnings of the Independent 
Contractors and On-Demand Worker populations we identified using SIPP data.  
In addition, we can translate our estimate to the amount of Social Security 
contributions that should have been paid on these workers’ earnings. For purposes 
of this analysis, we assume all unreported earnings would be subject to SE taxes 
and that all workers earned less than $137,700. The background on the tax gap and 
existing work on SE tax compliance below provides additional context for 
 
94  Id. at 14. 
95  See 2015 SIPP PRODUCTION, supra note 15 (calculating the sum of income reported by independent 
contractors and on-demand workers by tabulating applicable TJB1_GAMT1 through TJB7_GAMT 
variables); see also supra notes 20–21 discussion and accompanying text.  
 
2021] Failure to Contribute 71 
understanding our methodology in making these estimates. Our estimates are not 
intended to be comparable to estimates developed by Congressional estimators or 
other government projections. 
 
A. The Tax Gap and Underreported Self-Employment Taxes 
 
The IRS performs a regular study that estimates the gross tax gap—the 
difference between the amount of tax that taxpayers should pay for a given year 
and the amount that is paid.96 The tax gap is measured in terms of non-filing, 
underreporting of income, and underpayment of taxes: “Of these three categories, 
taxpayer underreporting makes up the vast majority of the tax collection 
shortfall.”97 In 2016, the IRS published data for the tax years 2008 to 2010 and 
found a total underreporting tax gap of sixty-five billion dollars of SE tax, an 
underpayment tax gap of six billion dollars of employment tax, and an annual non-
filing tax gap of four billion dollars from SE taxes.98 Additionally, the IRS estimates 
that non-reporting of self-employment tax constitutes approximately one percent of 
the non-filing gap, and underreporting of self-employment tax constitutes fourteen 
percent of the total share of the gross total tax gap.99  
Importantly, the IRS has found that misreporting of income that is subject to 
withholding and information reporting is one percent, but where there is no 
withholding and there is little or no information reporting, instances of 
misreporting jump to sixty-three percent.100 As Congressional revenue estimators 
have noted, noncompliance is greatest for self-employment income “for which third-
party information is not separately reported to the IRS and is very difficult to 
obtain.”101 Essentially, there is more compliance when income is “visible” to the IRS 
and taxpayers through withholding and information reporting.102 
  
 
96  Janet Holtzblatt & Jamie McGuire, Factors Affecting Revenue Estimates of Tax Compliance Proposals, Joint 
Working Paper of the Congressional Budget Office and the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 1 (Cong. 
Budget Office, Working Paper No. JCX-90-16, 2016), 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4964. 
97  Manoj Viswanathan, Tax Compliance in a Decentralizing Economy, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 283, 287 (2017).  
98  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008-2010 4 tbl.2 (2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%202008%20through%202010.pdf 
[hereinafter IRS 2008-2010 Tax Gap Data]. In September 2019, the IRS issued new tax gap data that found 
that tax compliance rates had remained “essentially unchanged” from prior years. Press Release, Internal 
Revenue Serv., IRS Releases New Tax Game Estimates; Compliance Rates Remain Substantially 
Unchanged from Prior Study (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-releases-new-tax-gap-
estimates-compliance-rates-remain-substantially-unchanged-from-prior-study. 
99  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 98, at 4. 
100  Id. at 2.  
101  Holtzblatt & McGuire, supra note 96, at 2. 
102  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 98, at 2.  
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B. Treasury’s Prior Work on Underpayment of Self-Employed Income Tax 
 
In prior years, the U.S. Treasury considered strategies for addressing the tax 
gap through increased auditing and new processes to “accurately identify the 
taxpayers and income that are subject to self-employment taxes.”103 In fact, a 2007 
memorandum to the Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement from the 
U.S. Treasury Deputy Inspector General for Audit (“Treasury IG”) reflected the 
results of an audit of these strategies to determine how to improve identification of 
unreported self-employment taxes (“2007 TIGTA Audit”).104 As part of the 2007 
TIGTA Audit, the Treasury IG reviewed a statistically valid sample of 138 tax-year 
returns from 2003 with incomes of $2,000 or more on a Form 1040 Profit or Loss 
from Business Schedule C, Profit or Loss from Farming Schedule F, and/or line 
twenty-one that contained other income, but that did not include a Schedule SE 
reporting SE taxes.105 
Of the 138 returns the Treasury IG reviewed, 52 were selected for audit, 50 
audits were completed, 5 were closed with no change, and 12 had been “closed with 
little or no examination of the returns.”106 For the remaining 33 returns (23.91%), 
however, the examination averaged an additional SE tax liability of $1,818 per 
return.107 Of the 86 returns that had not been selected for audit, 28 appeared to 
have SE tax liabilities (20.29%), averaging an additional SE tax liability of $1,217 
per return.108 
 
C. Estimates for Underreporting of Independent Contractors and On-Demand 
Workers Using SIPP 
 
For purposes of developing our estimates on the underpayment of SE tax by 
Independent Contractors, we relied on the data developed in the 2007 TIGTA Audit. 
Notably, our estimates only approximate the average amount of underpayment of 
SE tax on average income for the Independent Contractors we identified using 
SIPP. To develop an average underpayment amount we could apply to the earnings 
and populations of Independent Contractors, we calculated an average using the 
data from the 2007 TIGTA Audit by adding the 33 audited returns with additional 
SE tax liability of $1,818 and the 28 returns that appeared to have an estimated 
$1,217 underpayment of SE tax liability. This totaled 61 out of 138 returns or 44.2% 
of returns that had an underpayment of SE tax.109 Additionally, we averaged the 33 
 
103  TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., IDENTIFICATION OF UNREPORTED SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAXES CAN 
BE IMPROVED 2 (2007). 
104  Id. at 2–3. 
105  Id. at 2. 
106  Id. (footnote omitted). 
107  Id. 
108  Id. at 3. An additional 6 returns appeared to have SE tax liabilities exceeding $2,000. Id. 
109  Experts we consulted, including James R. White, former U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
director of tax research on strategic issues, suggested that a rate of 44.2% of returns with underpayment of 
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returns averaging $1,818 of additional liability per return with the 28 returns 
averaging $1,217 per return to approximate an average underpayment of SE tax 
liability of $1,542. 
 
i. Independent Contractors 
 
To calculate the number of Independent Contractors underreporting SE tax 
liability, we started with the collective earnings of this population for 2014, $204.1 
billion (based on SIPP), and calculated that the average earnings of these 7.1 
million workers were $28,746.48. Further, we calculated that the SE tax owed on 
$28,746.48 was $4,398.21, but given that the average underreporting of SE tax 
using the 2007 TIGTA report was $1,542, we assumed that where underreporting of 
SE tax had occurred, it would be approximately 35.1% of the amount actually owed. 
Using the 2007 TIGTA Audit, we derived that an estimated 44.2% of 
taxpayers with self-employment income underreported their self-employment 
income on their Form 1040; we estimated that 3.1 million Independent Contractors 
underreported their SE tax. We then calculated that these 3.1 million Independent 
Contractors had average earnings of $28,746.48, translating to collective earnings of 
$90.21 billion. The amount of SE tax owed on $90.21 billion was $13.80 billion. 
However, given that there is a 35.1% average underreporting of income, we then 
estimated that $4.84 billion of SE tax was underreported by Independent 
Contractors in 2014 and that approximately $3.92 billion of this amount constituted 
underreported Social Security contributions. Table 1 summarizes our estimates. 
  
 
SE tax was, in fact, too conservative. For example, in 2007, GAO issued a report finding “at least 61% of 
sole proprietors underreported their net income by $93.6 billion in 2001.” JAMES R. WHITE, U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX GAP: A STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR 
ADDRESSING SOLE PROPRIETOR NONCOMPLIANCE 3 (2007). 
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Table 1: Estimate of Underpayment of Social Security Contributions for 
Independent Contractors Using Treasury Estimates 
 
Total Earnings of Independent Contractors in 
2014 
$204.1 Billion  
Estimated number of Independent 
Contractors from SIPP & Average Earnings  
7.1 Million/$28,746.48 Avg. 
Earnings 
2007 TIGTA Audit % of Returns with 
Underpayment 
44.2% 
2007 TIGTA Audit Average SE Tax 
Underpayment  
$1,542 
Average Rate of Underpayment 
($1,542/$4,398) 
35.1%  
Estimated number of Independent 
Contractors with Additional SE Tax 
Liabilities  
3.1 million (7.1 million x 44.2%) 
Total Earnings of Underreporting 
Independent Contractors  
$90.21 Billion (3.1 million x 
$28.746.48) 
SE Tax Owed on Earnings of Underreporting 
Independent Contractors  
$13.80 Billion ($90.21 x 15.3%) 
Estimated amount Underreported SE Tax for 
Independent Contractors 
$4.84 Billion ($13.80 Billion x 
35.1%) 
Estimated amount of Underpayment of Social 
Security  
$3.92 Billion ($4.8 Billion x 
81.05%)110 
 
ii. On-Demand Workers 
 
Even though Independent Contractors are often considered major 
contributors to the tax gap because they primarily deal in cash, many On-Demand 
Workers—particularly those doing On-Platform work—deal extensively in 
electronic payment.111  Often, it depends on how an On-Demand Worker is paid—
electronically, by cash, or by check—and whether they are an On-Platform or Off-
Platform Worker that dictates whether (and if) a worker will receive either Form 
1099-MISC or Form 1099-K.112 As previously noted, research and anecdotal 
evidence finds that most On-Demand Platforms have adopted the 200/$20K Form 
1099-K Filing Threshold for reporting income of On-Platform Workers to the IRS.113  
As a result, many of the largest On-Demand Platforms (for example, Uber, 
Etsy, or Airbnb) do not (and are not required to) provide their On-Platform Workers 
 
110  Social Security comprises 12.4% of the 15.3% self-employment tax contribution, or 81.05% of self-
employment tax. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY & MEDICARE TAX, 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/taxRates.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2020). 
111  See supra Section I.C.  
112  See BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 9–10.  
113  See July 2018 Senate Testimony, supra note 9.  
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with any Form 1099-K because earnings for On-Demand Platform work, on average, 
are below the twenty-thousand dollar annual threshold or On-Platform workers fail 
to meet the aggregate 200-transaction test.114 Academic research has 
(conservatively) estimated that, for Airbnb alone, “there is approximately $20 
billion of revenue paid to hosts, the bulk of whom likely do not receive a Form 1099-
K.”115 
In fact, one survey of On-Platform Workers found that in 2015, only 32% of 
On-Demand Workers received a Form 1099-K or Form 1099-MISC from their On-
Demand Platform.116 More recently, the California Tax Analysis found that in 2016, 
only 12% of the top 100 On-Demand Platforms issued a Form 1099-K to service 
providers.117 This lack of issuance results in, at best, On-Demand Workers 
underreporting their income when filing their taxes, and, at worst, failure to file 
altogether.118 
While the research on On-Platform Work shows that these workers are less 
likely to get a Form 1099 and more likely to misreport their income, taxpayer 
industry survey data from 2018 indicates that, generally, self-employed workers 
either underreport (32%) or fail to report (36%) their income altogether.119 
Moreover, when there is underreporting of income on U.S household surveys by self-
employed respondents, they underreport by about 30%.120 These findings are 
instructive to building a model to estimate the underpayment and nonpayment of 
SE tax by the population of On-Demand Workers we identified using SIPP. 
 
114  Id.; see also Understanding Your Tax Documents, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/tax-
information/tax-documents/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2020) (notifying partners that they will only receive 1099-
Ks when they meet the 200/$20K Form 1099-K Threshold); Making Sense of Your Tax Form, ETSY (Feb. 21, 
2018), https://www.etsy.com/seller-handbook/article/making-sense-of-your-tax-forms/22660467494 
(notifying sellers that they will only receive 1099-Ks when they meet the 200/$20K Form 1099-K 
Threshold); Should I Expect to Receive a Tax Form from Airbnb?, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/414/should-i-expect-to-receive-a-tax-form-from-airbnb (last visited Oct. 
17, 2020) (notifying hosts that they will only receive 1099-Ks when they meet the 200/$20K Form 1099-K 
Threshold); JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 14 (detailing the average monthly earnings for the four 
major sectors of the On-Demand Platform economy, which range from a low of $608 (e.g., selling on Etsy) to 
a high of $1,736 (e.g., renting a home on Airbnb)). Even if an On-Platform Worker were to work every 
month in a year, which is not reflective of what most research indicates On-Platform Workers do, average 
income from that On-Platform Work still only ranges from $7,296 to $20,832. But even in those cases where 
leasing a room or renting a house would result in $20,832, the requirement of more than 200 transactions 
has to be satisfied. In addition, Airbnb’s own research has found that “[t]he average American Airbnb host 
over the age of 65 earns $8,350 in supplemental income annually for a single listing.” AIRBNB, HOME 
SHARING: A POWERFUL OPTION TO HELP OLDER AMERICANS STAY IN THEIR HOMES 3 (2016), 
https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/livable-communities/livable-documents/documents-2016/Airbnb-
HomeSharing-OlderAmericans-Report-11-2016.pdf. 
115  Viswanathan, supra note 97, at 317.  
116  BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 10. The specific survey question asked respondents whether they had received a 
Form 1099-MISC or Form 1099-K from the On-Demand Platform they worked with in 2015. Id. 
Approximately 32% of respondents reported receiving a Form 1099; 61% reported not receiving a Form 1099 
and 6% did not know whether they received a Form 1099. Id. 
117  CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., supra note 53, at 14. 
118  See The Sharing Economy: A Taxing Experience for New Entrepreneurs Part I: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Small Bus., 114th Cong. 4 (2016) (statement of Caroline Bruckner). 
119  See supra note 28 discussion and accompanying text. 
120  Hurst et al., supra note 27, at 3. 
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Specifically, we began with the $35.97 billion of earnings of the On-Demand 
Worker population we estimated using SIPP data.121 Using the taxpayer industry 
survey findings discussed in Part I—that only 32% of self-employed workers 
properly report their income while 32% underreport and 36% failed to report any 
income altogether122—we assumed that 32% of these earnings were properly 
reported for SE tax purposes. This assumption left an approximate gap of $24.46 
billion potentially underreported or not reported by On-Demand Workers in 2014. 
We then segregated the $24.46 billion into $11.51 billion (or 32%) of underreported 
earnings and $12.95 billion (or 36%) of earnings not reported altogether. 
From there, we assumed, consistent with research on underreporting rates by 
self-employed workers on household surveys, that On-Demand Workers 
underreported their earnings by thirty percent.123 We calculated that this 
underreporting would result in an underreporting of $528 million (15.3% SE tax 
multiplied by $3.45 billion) and $428 million of Social Security contributions. To 
calculate the amount On-Demand Workers failed to contribute altogether, we 
multiplied $12.95 billion by the SE tax rate (15.3%) and determined $1.98 billion of 
SE tax and $1.61 billion of Social Security contributions went unpaid.124 
Collectively, we estimated that On-Demand Workers failed to contribute $2.51 
billion in SE tax and $2.03 billion in Social Security in 2014. 
  
 
121  As noted earlier, some of the workers we included in the population of On-Demand Workers are Off-
Platform Workers, and others may have been employees subject to withholding. This reflects some of the 
limitations of using SIPP data to estimate SE tax of On-Platform Workers. To provide context for our SIPP 
data estimates, we developed alternative estimates using the 2017 BLS ACW Survey data on Independent 
Contractors, as well as the 2017 ACW Gig Economy Supplement and the JPMCI 2018 Data to contextualize 
our estimates. See infra Table 3 and accompanying text.  
122  See supra note 28 discussion and accompanying text. 
123  Hurst et al., supra note 27, at 3. 
124  See supra text accompanying note 98. 
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Table 2: Estimate of Under- and Nonpayment of Social Security 
Contributions for On-Demand Workers Using 2014 SIPP Data  
 
Estimated income from On-Demand 
Workers (ODW) 
$35.97 Billion ODW Earnings 
Estimate of the Amount of ODW Earnings 
Underreported (32%) and Not Reported 
(36%) 
$11.51 Billion (32% Underreported) 
$12.95 Billion (36% Not Reported) 
Rate of Underreporting of Earnings  $3.45 Billion ($11.51 Billion x 30%) 
Underreporting of SE tax  $528 Million ($3.45 Billion x 15.3%) 
Underreporting of Social Security 
Contributions  
$428 Million ($528 Million x 81.05%) 
Estimated amount of SE Tax Not Paid by 
ODW 
$2.51 Billion ($1.98 Billion + $528 
Million) 
Estimated amount of Social Security 
contributions Not Paid 
$2.03 Billion  
 
iii. Alternative Estimates 
 
To provide context for our SIPP data estimates, we also estimated how much 
SE tax went underreported by the 10.6 million Independent Contractors identified 
in the 2017 BLS ACW Survey.125 As set forth in Table 3 below, we estimated how 
much SE tax went underreported by the 2.3 million On-Platform Workers identified 
in the 2017 ACW Gig Economy Supplement as well as the JPMCI 2018 Study and 
the 2019 TIGTA Audit. To calculate the Independent Contractor underreporting of 
SE tax estimates from the 2017 BLS ACW Survey, we used the 44.2% 
underreporting rate of SE tax we derived from the 2007 TIGTA Audit. For the On-
Platform Workers counted in the 2017 ACW Gig Economy Supplement and JPMCI 
2018 Study, we assumed that 68% of the workers counted in these estimates did not 
receive any Form 1099; then we applied a 63% likelihood of underreporting to our 
results.126 To determine the total number of workers that underreported SE tax 
liabilities from the 2019 TIGTA Audit, we used the 25% rate of underreporting 
identified in approximately 3.8 million individuals who received a Form 1099-K that 
did not report income on a Schedule C or Form 1040 line 21.127 We then used the 
 
125  BLS ACW 2017 SURVEY, supra note 72, at 6. 
126  We believe 68% to be a reasonable assumption because it is consistent with prior survey data specifically 
asking respondents working with On-Demand Platforms whether they received any Form 1099 for their 
On-Platform work. An alternative is to rely on the data from the California Tax Analysis that found that 
only 12% of the Top 100 Platforms in 2016 issued 1099-Ks; however, the California Tax Analysis does not 
consider whether Form 1099-MISCs were issued instead of Form 1099-K. See supra text accompanying note 
53. 
127  See supra text accompanying notes 59–60. 
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average underreporting amount of $1,542 we derived from the 2007 TIGTA Audit to 
estimate a collective amount of unreported SE tax liabilities.  
Similar to using SIPP data to derive estimates of SE tax underpayment for 
Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers, there are limitations with 
using alternative measures of independent workers or On-Platform Workers. For 
example, the number of On-Platform Workers included in the JPMCI 2018 Study 
includes workers who earned income from rental activities not likely subject to SE 
tax.128 Additionally, we did not have the collective earnings of these populations, so 
we used an alternative methodology to illustrate underreporting. This alternative 
methodology did not consider how much income these workers failed to contribute 
to SE tax altogether. If we included non-reported amounts of income, then the 
estimates would likely be significantly higher, but we erred on the side of caution 
and assumed that the workers who misreported their income merely underreported 
their SE tax by $1,542 rather than failed to contribute altogether. These results are 
set forth in Table 3. 
  
 
128  See supra note 34 discussion. 
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Table 3: Comparison of Estimates of Underpayment of SE Tax and Social 
Security Contributions BLS 2017 ACW Survey Data 
 
Summary of 





















Report on Gig 
Economy  
Total # of 
Workers 
10,600,000 1,600,000 2,300,000 3,779,329 
(Includes 
Forms for TY 
2012-2016) 





















Schedule C or 
Line 21) 




$7.22 Billion  $1.05 Billion  $1.5 
Billion  
$1.25B 




$5.85 Billion  $856 Million  $1.2 
Billion  
$1 Billion  
 
V. DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SIPP DATA INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND ON-
DEMAND WORKFORCE, AND THE EFFECTS OF UNDERPAYMENT ON SOCIAL 
SECURITY BENEFITS 
 
As noted earlier, this Article seeks not only to quantify the impact of 
Independent Contractors’ and On-Demand Workers’ likely underpayment of SE tax 
and Social Security contributions but also to consider the implications of these 
underpayments in terms of what it means for these workers’ Social Security 
benefits. Important groundwork has already been completed and some research has 
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already considered the economic security of U.S. On-Demand Workers and what 
this work means for these workers’ retirement.129  
For example, a 2015 International Labour Office survey of Amazon 
Mechanical Turk and Crowdflower workers in the United States and India found 
that most of the U.S. workers on those platforms, who use platform work as their 
main source of income, “lack [S]ocial [S]ecurity coverage . . . a mere 8.1% of main job 
crowdworkers, in the [United States], report making regular contributions to a 
private retirement account and only 9.4% contribute to [S]ocial [S]ecurity, raising 
concerns about the financial situation of these workers when they reach retirement 
age.”130 Moreover, other critical research on the retirement issues facing On-
Demand Workers has confirmed the reality that since most On-Demand Platforms 
classify their workers as Independent Contractors, those workers “are 
approximately two-thirds less likely than standard employees to have access to an 
employer-provided retirement plan.”131 
SIPP-collected demographic information provides a unique opportunity to 
consider the impact of the failure to contribute to Social Security and other 
retirement security issues of Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers 
beyond their earnings. Estimates on the demographics of these workforces range—
again depending on how these workers are defined.   
For example, in a 2015 report, GAO found that Independent Contractors—
including On-Demand Workers—more often appear to be younger and Hispanic 
than any other age, race, or ethnicity.132 However, MBO Partners, in its 2019 
report, described the average Independent Contractor as more likely to be male 
than female.133 The JPMCI 2018 Study confirmed a number of these findings—
particularly with respect to those On-Platform Workers earning income in the 
transportation sector, which is by far the largest sector of the On-Demand Economy, 
when it concluded that the majority of On-Platform Workers were men working as 
rideshare drivers.134 However, this same study found that there were more women 
than men in each of the other sectors (i.e., non-transport work, selling, and leasing), 
but relative to transportation, those other sectors were a small portion of the On-
Demand Economy.135 
 
129  See generally Berg, supra note 13, at 563−69 (discussing an international comparison to the underreported 
income that was not taxed towards social security and the detrimental effects it can have on workers).  
130  Id. at 563. Crowdwork is a kind of work performed remotely on an online platform where workers perform 
“micro-tasks” and are paid for singular tasks in response to business’ posts via platforms. Id. at 545. Typical 
categories of tasks include researching information on the internet, verifying tweets, completing academic 
surveys, and gaining content access. Id. 
131  Secunda, supra note 13, at 436. Secunda’s article is the first to argue that On-Demand Workers be treated 
as common-law employees for retirement purposes to qualify for ERISA purposes. Id. at 437. 
132  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65, at 5.  
133  MBO 2019 REPORT, supra note 4, at 7. 
134  JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 22.  
135  Id. Going forward, it will be interesting to see what happens with the transportation sector of the On-
Demand Economy with the advent of driverless cars, which may be years away. See generally Hyperdrive, 
The State of the Self-Driving Car Race 2020, BLOOMBERG (May 15, 2020, 5:00 AM), 
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A. SIPP Demographic Data on Independent Contractors and On-Demand 
Workers 
 
Using SIPP, as displayed in Figure 1, we estimated that Baby Boomers or 
individuals aged 55 and over (50.68%) in 2014 were more often Independent 
Contractors, followed by Generation X or individuals aged 34 to 54 (26.06%) and 
Millennials aged 18 to 33 (23.36%) in 2014. We found that Independent Contractors 
were more likely to be women (55.88%) than men (44.12%), as displayed in Figure 
2. And we found that Independent Contractors were most often white (67.47%), 





https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2020-self-driving-car-race/ (listing companies that are developing 








Figure 1: SIPP Independent Contractors in 2014
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Figure 2: SIPP Independent Contractors By Gender, in 2014
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With respect to the population of On-Demand Workers we identified using 
SIPP, displayed in Figure 4, we found that Generation X (45.40%) was more often 
engaged as On-Demand Workers than Baby Boomers (36.82%) and Millennials 
(17.78%). Additionally, we found that On-Demand Workers were slightly more 
likely to be women (51.81%) than men (48.18%) (Figure 5). Finally, we found that 
On-Demand Workers were most often white (67.03%), followed by Hispanic/Latinx 
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Figure 4: SIPP On-Demand Workers By Age in 2014
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Figure 5: SIPP On-Demand Workers By Sex, in 2014
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These results are somewhat consistent with readily available data from at 
least one On-Demand Platform—Airbnb. In a March 2016 report detailing Airbnb’s 
growing population of women hosts over sixty years old, Airbnb researchers found 
that seniors are the best rated and fastest growing demographic of Airbnb hosts in 
the United States, and the majority of women hosting on Airbnb are “empty nesters 
looking to make ends meet.”136 More recently, in March 2018, Airbnb touted its 
success with helping D.C. senior hosts to age in their homes.137 Our SIPP analysis 
of On-Demand Workers indicates that they older than most other estimates suggest 
and are slightly more likely to be women. Apart from rental income, which is 
generally not subject to SE tax, earnings of On-Demand Workers could have a large 
impact on their receipt of Social Security benefits. 
 
B. Implications for Social Security Benefits 
 
Social Security benefits are based on a worker’s earning history and age at 
retirement and are designed to “replace part of a worker’s earnings.”138 A worker is 
eligible for Social Security after they work in Social Security-covered employment 
for ten or more years (i.e., forty earnings credits or four credits per year).139  
In 2020, self-employed individuals earn one credit for every $1,410 of 
earnings, up to the maximum four work credits for $5,640 in earnings that can be 
earned in one year.140 Additionally, a worker’s initial monthly benefit is based on 
their thirty-five highest years of earnings, which are indexed to historical wage 
growth.141 The thirty-five highest years of indexed earnings are divided by thirty-
five to determine the worker’s career-average annual earnings.142 The resulting 
amount is divided by twelve to determine the worker’s average indexed monthly 
 
136  AIRBNB, WOMEN HOSTS, supra note 7, at 2. However, most rental income is not subject to SE tax and would 
not be included in calculating Social Security benefits. See supra note 34 discussion. 
137  See AIRBNB, D.C. SENIORS, supra note 7, at 2. 
138  HUSTON, supra note 11, at 7.  
139  Id. at 8.  
140  SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Pub. No. 05-10022, IF YOU ARE SELF-EMPLOYED (2020).  
141  See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Social Security Benefit Amounts, https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/Benefits.html 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2020). 
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earnings (AIME).143 Workers with fewer than thirty-five years of earnings in 
covered employment or years of no earnings have zeroes entered in the 
computation, resulting in a lower AIME and, therefore, a lower monthly benefit.144  
The Social Security benefit is progressive in that “[i]t provides workers with 
low lifetime earnings a benefit that represents a higher percentage of their pre-
retirement income than higher-income workers. However, benefits are proportional 
to average lifetime earnings, and for workers with lower lifetime earnings[, such as 
women], benefits calculated under the regular formula will . . . be . . . low.”145 This 
exacerbates existing challenges for women: in 2015, the average benefit for women 
was $14,184, compared to $18,000 for men.146 Often, women take time out of the 
workforce to care for family, and as a result, do not earn credits toward their Social 
Security benefits during that time and have a lower AIME.147 
At the same time, academic research has resoundingly concluded that women 
are “more economically vulnerable” than men in retirement because women retire 
with less retirement savings, assets, and Social Security benefits than men, despite 
women tending to live longer and having more healthcare costs.148 In addition, “[f]or 
all but the highest–income families, Social Security provides the largest source of 
retirement income.”149 For women in particular, Social Security income, as modest 
as it may be on average, is the only income keeping nearly half of women sixty-five 
and older from poverty.150 
 
C. Implications for Social Security Solvency 
 
Given Social Security's critical role in helping so many beneficiaries avoid 
poverty, our estimate of the $5.95 billion in unpaid Social Security contributions—
likely a result of Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers' approximately 
$7.35 billion in underpaid self-employment taxes in 2014—merits additional 
analysis. Such additional analysis will focus on how the unpaid contributions 
impact the solvency of Social Security. 
Social Security faces long-term financing difficulties. In its most recent report 
(“2020 Trustees’ Report”), the Social Security Trustees projected the program cost 
for 2020 “to be less than total income by about $4 billion and exceed non-interest 
income by about $73 billion.”151 Additionally, the 2020 Trustees’ Report estimates 
 
143  Id. 
144  HUSTON, supra note 11, at 8. 
145  Joan Entmacher & Amy Matsui, Addressing the Challenges Women Face in Retirement: Improving Social 
Security, Pensions, and SSI, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 749, 754 (2013).  
146  Stan-Hinden, Women and Social Security Benefits, AARP (Feb. 2017), https://www.aarp.org/work/social-
security/info-2014/women-and-social-security-benefits.html. 
147  Id.  
148  Etmacher & Matsui, supra note 145, at 749. 
149  Id. at 750. 
150  Id. at 751. 
151  THE BD. OF TRUSTEES, THE 2020 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND 
SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 2 (2020). 
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that the trust funds currently have enough in reserves to sufficiently pay program 
costs over the next ten years.152 However, the most recent estimates do not reflect 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. 153  
Using SIPP, we estimated approximately $3.92 billion in underpayment of 
Social Security contributions from Independent Contractors and $2.03 billion in 
underpayment and nonpayment from On-Demand Workers in 2014. Historically, 
government research on sole proprietors has shown high rates of underreporting of 
their income—even higher than we used in calculating our estimates.154 And while 
that research may precede the advent of the On-Demand Economy, the data we 
used from SIPP might, too. The On-Demand Economy has grown substantially since 
2014 and added millions of workers in the last four years, who may not have been 
captured by our SIPP data.155 In addition, our estimates for underpayment of SE 
tax of Independent Contractors are based on averages of underpayment of SE tax 
and do not account for the likely nonpayment of tax by this population altogether. 
As a result, we suspect that our estimates are conservative as to the regular 
underpayment of SE tax by Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers, 
particularly with respect to those On-Platform Workers we included, the majority of 
whom will not receive any Form 1099 to prompt proper reporting of their income.156 
Moreover, with respect to the Off-Platform Workers we included in our On-Demand 
Workers estimates, we note that innovations in terms of digitizing payments 
suggest that more Off-Platform Workers are (and will be) paid in ways not subject 
to information reporting under current law.157  
Even the most robust research on the size, scope, and earnings of On-
Demand Economy workers concedes that new payment options could involve 
bypassing a bank account entirely, potentially resulting in undercounting 
participants in the On-Demand Platform Economy.158 Even with the foregoing 
qualifications, we find that there is, at the very least, an annual $7.35 billion in 
underpayment of SE tax by these workers. This underpayment should be addressed 
to shore up the overall solvency of Social Security and ensure that workers’ AIME is 
properly calculated. 
 
VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
As part of its recommendations for shoring up the long-term financing of 
Social Security, the 2020 Trustees’ Report recommends that “lawmakers address 
 
152  Id. 
153  Id.  
154  See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 109.  
155  See supra Part II. 
156  See supra Section I.C. 
157  See Ryan Browne, Digital Payments Expected to Hit 726 Billion by 2020—But Cash Isn’t Going Anywhere 
Yet, CNBC (Oct. 9, 2017, 6:46 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/09/digital-payments-expected-to-hit-726-
billion-by-2020-study-finds.html (quoting private sector report finding “non-cash transactions between 2014 
and 2015 rose 11.2 percent, the highest growth of the past decade.”). 
158  JPMCI 2018 STUDY, supra note 2, at 9.  
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the projected trust fund shortfalls in a timely way in order to phase in necessary 
changes gradually and give workers and beneficiaries time to adjust to them.”159 To 
facilitate tax administration and compliance, assist independent contractors 
generally, and aid On-Platform service providers and sellers specifically, Congress 
needs to take additional action to modernize information reporting requirements, 
update quarterly-estimated filing due dates, and require IRS developed tax 
guidance that On-Demand Platforms can provide to service providers and sellers as 
part of the onboarding process. 
 
A. Align the Form 1099-MISC and 1099-K Reporting Thresholds  
 
Academic research shows that, under certain circumstances, enhanced 
information reporting can reduce the tax gap.160 In fact, “the degree to which 
taxpayers fail to include income on their tax returns, or underreport, is directly 
related to the extent these income items are subject to information reporting.”161 
Given the current practice adopted by the majority of On-Demand Platforms to use 
the 200/$20K Form 1099-K Reporting Threshold for furnishing Form 1099-Ks to 
On-Platform Workers: 
Congress should move forward with modernizing the information 
reporting regime by lowering the filing threshold for Form 1099-K to 
[$1,000 and limiting the aggregate 200 transaction threshold]. At the 
same time, Congress should update the Form 1099-MISC threshold by 
raising it from $600 to [$1,000] to provide some relief for small 
businesses who are subject to the Form 1099-MISC filing rules [for the 
independent contractors they hire]. Keep in mind, the Form 1099-
MISC filing thresholds have not been fundamentally reviewed or 
updated since at least 1954. Adjusted for inflation, $600 in 1954 would 
be more than $5,000 in today’s dollars.162 
By creating a uniform standard for reporting of self-employment income, 
Congress would limit the “tax opportunism” some On-Demand Platforms have 
 
159  THE BD. OF TRUSTEES, supra note 151, at 5. 
160  Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When is Information Reporting 
Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1733, 1736 (2010) (noting increased information reporting is not a 
“panacea” and that increased reporting imposes costs); see also Viswanathan, supra note 97, at 283 
(explaining how absent legislative intervention, On-Demand Platforms “pose a critical threat to the 
reporting system underlying domestic and international tax compliance.”). 
161  Viswanathan, supra note 97, at 288.  
162  July 2018 Senate Testimony, supra note 9, at 30 (footnotes omitted). 
H.R. 3717 takes the approach of aligning the Form 1099 threshold filing requirements at $1,500, 
among other tax changes targeted to small business. Other bills, notably, S. 1549, would align 
the thresholds at $1,000. S. 1549 goes further and includes other provisions on misclassification 
and provides for voluntary withholding agreements to be instituted between platforms and their 
service providers and sellers. 
Id. n.19. 
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engaged in by adopting the 200/$20,000 Form 1099-K Reporting Threshold.163 
Congress is generally aware of the budgetary impact this proposal would have and 
how it could translate to increased federal revenues. As part of its 2017 tax reform 
debate work, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) provided a score for a version 
of this proposal that would align the Form 1099-MISC and Form 1099-K at $1,000 
and estimated that it could raise as much as approximately $3.6 billion over a ten-
year budget window.164  
[In addition,] Congress is likely to enhance compliance by both 
taxpayers and reporting entities because more taxpayers will receive 
Form 1099s, which is . . . supported by the existing research on tax 
compliance and information reporting . . . . Some states have already 
moved forward with this approach and aligned the 1099-K and 1099-
MISC reporting thresholds at the current 1099-MISC level of $600 
with positive results.165 
 
B. Update Quarterly Estimated Payment Due Dates  
 
As noted earlier, 
when self-employed taxpayers are expected to owe at least $1,000 in 
taxes and are not subject to withholding, advance payments of 
estimated tax are due to the IRS throughout the year in the form of 
quarterly-estimated payments. It just doesn’t take that much income 
to trip over these filing requirements.166 
Moreover, research on the tax compliance of On-Demand Platform workers 
indicated that more than one-third of respondents did not know whether they were 
required to file quarterly estimated payments on the income they earned working 
with a platform.167 
The former IRS National Taxpayer Advocate repeatedly recommended that 
anything that can be done “to help taxpayers make their estimated tax payments 
more easily and lessen the burden of saving to make such payments is likely to 
increase compliance.”168 In order to facilitate tax compliance and ease taxpayer 
burden, Congress should update the filing deadlines for second- and third-quarter 
 
163  See generally Can Sharing Be Taxed?, supra note 8, at 1032–45. 
164  Joint Comm. on Taxation, Estimated Revenue Effects of the Chairman's Mark of the "Tax Cuts And Jobs 
Act," Scheduled for Markup by the Committee on Finance on November 13, 2017 (JCX-52-17) (Nov. 9. 2017), 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5033. 
165  July 2018 Senate Testimony, supra note 9, at 30. “In 2017 both Vermont and Massachusetts began to 
require information reporting for income earned by small business on-demand platform operators and paid 
electronically at the current 1099-MISC threshold of $600. According to the industry experts, the lower 
reporting threshold in Massachusetts ‘catapulted reporting by over 100%.’” Id. n.20. 
166  Id. at 30 (footnote omitted). 
167  The Sharing Economy: Part I, supra note 8, at 25. 
168  The Sharing Economy: A Taxing Experience for New Entrepreneurs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small 
Bus., 113th Cong. 10 (2016) (statement of Nina Olson, IRS National Taxpayer Advocate). 
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installment payments set forth in IRC § 6654(c) to be due two weeks after a 
quarter’s end, rather than in the middle of a quarter as is required under current 
law.169 
A bipartisan small-business tax bill proposed by the leadership of the U.S. 
House of Representatives Small Business Committee (H.R. 3717) in 2017 does just 
that and modernizes the existing filing deadlines to reflect the business reality of 
the second and third quarters’ ends.170 This change is likely to increase compliance 
because under current law, “[t]axpayers must remember oddly spaced payment 
dates . . . [that] do not consistently coincide with calendar quarters, making it 
difficult to calculate net income and confusing to taxpayers.”171 By simply changing 
existing due dates to fall after a quarter’s end, Congress can ease the burdensome 
process of estimating income for purposes of remitting quarterly estimated 
payments because taxpayers will actually know how much they earned the 
preceding quarter rather than requiring taxpayers to make their best guess. 
 
C. Require the IRS to Develop and Publish Guidance for On-Demand 
Platforms to Provide Service Providers and Sellers as Part of the 
Onboarding Process. 
 
Survey data of experienced On-Platform Workers show a significant 
knowledge gap between what taxpayers understand their tax obligations to be, if 
any, and what they actually are.172 “[M]any [on-demand] platforms are hesitant to 
provide tax information to their service providers and sellers due to ongoing 
concerns and litigation over misclassification issues. To address the knowledge gap, 
the National Taxpayer Advocate has recommended the IRS develop a checklist for 
first-time, self-employed on-demand economy workers and sellers.”173 Anecdotal and 
survey evidence suggest that taxpayers want to do the right thing: 
[They] are unfamiliar with the requirements of quarterly estimated 
payments. By the time taxpayers learn that they have failed to file 
quarterly estimated payments on this income, many just walk away 
and fail to file altogether. By developing accessible content that [On-
Demand] platforms can distribute to service providers and sellers as 
part of the onboarding process, the IRS can make immediate progress 
in addressing the knowledge gap that even experienced, self-employed 
small business owners have.174 
  
 
169  I.R.C. § 6654(c) (2018). 
170  Small Business Owners’ Tax Simplification Act of 2017, H.R. 3717, 115th Cong. (2017). 
171  113th Cong. 10. 
172  See BRUCKNER, supra note 1, at 12. 
173  July 2018 Senate Testimony, supra note 9, at 31. 
174  Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This Article intends to shed light on the Social Security implications of the 
current federal tax rules for self-employed, non-employer workers working outside 
of a traditional employment relationship, as well as self-employed individuals who 
work in occupations that occur in the On-Demand Economy. Such implications are 
ascertained by estimating the population and earnings of these workers using the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s redesigned Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP). Ultimately, we estimated there were 7.1 million Independent Contractors 
and 3.1 million On-Demand Workers earning self-employment income in 2014.175 
These workers are likely to have failed to contribute as much as $7.35 billion in SE 
tax in 2014, which translates to at least $5.95 billion in underpaid Social Security 
contributions. 
The research measuring these workers is dynamic, but there appears to be 
consensus that On-Demand Workers represent a population that is hard to measure 
in terms of size, composition, and earnings. However, even with conservative 
estimates on the underpayment of SE tax, there remains a significant—potentially 
multi-billion-dollar—probability that millions of the workers we estimated are not 
paying into Social Security. This a particularly acute problem for women, who tend 
to have greater dependency on Social Security and lower contributions over the 
course of their working lives. This problem will continue to grow along with the 
digitizing of the cash economy. Although Congress has limited options, it can try to 
modernize information reporting, update quarterly estimated payment 
requirements, and require distribution of tax guidance to help address these issues 
and further support the solvency of Social Security.  
 
175  See supra notes 16–19 discussion and accompanying text. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
For preparing the estimates included in this Article, we extrapolated data 
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
on populations of workers we identified as Independent Contractors and On-
Demand Workers, including the overall number of workers in these groups and 
their collective earnings. We then surveyed academic literature and existing 
National Bureau of Economy Research, U.S. Department of Treasury, and IRS 
reports on: (1) the tax gap, (2) underreporting and underpayment of self-
employment taxes, and (3) tax compliance surveys of workers using On-Demand 
Platforms for selling goods and services. We also relied on 2018 tax-preparer 
industry survey data on the under- and nonreporting of income by self-employed 
workers.  
To develop an average underpayment amount we could apply to the 
population of Independent Contractors and On-Demand Workers, we analyzed data 
from the 2007 TIGTA Audit to determine that: (1) 44.2% of returns that TIGTA 
included in its statistically valid sample reported Schedule C or Schedule F income 
but did not include a Schedule SE and had an underpayment of SE tax; and (2) the 
average underpayment of self-employment tax liability was $1,542.  The 2007 
TIGTA data is relevant because it was (at the time of publication) the only recent 
methodology available from TIGTA on the underpayment of SE Tax. We adopted 
this methodology for use in this exercise not to be definitive or exact but rather as 
an illustrative and fairly representative measure of existing tax audits on the 
underreporting of SE Tax. 
To calculate the number and amount of Independent Contractors 
underreporting self-employment tax liability, we used the following assumptions: 
44.2% of the 7.1 million Independent Contractors we identified using SIPP 
underreported their SE tax liability on their 2014 Form 1040s, on average, by 
$1,542. We also assumed the collective earnings of this population of $204.1 billion 
translated to $28,746.48 of earnings on average, and that the average 
underpayment of SE tax on these earnings was 35.1%. We calculated this would 
result in $4.84 billion in additional SE tax that should have been collected on this 
income in 2014, and that approximately $3.92 billion of this amount is 
underreported Social Security contributions. To compare our results with more 
recent data sets, we ran a variation of these calculations using the 10.6 million 
Independent Contractor population from the 2017 BLS ACW Survey. This 
calculation assumed that 44.2% of that population underreported their earnings by 
$1,542. 
With respect to our estimates for On-Demand Workers, because our 
population data was likely over-inclusive and our earnings data was under 
representative, we calculated our estimates using the total SIPP earnings data of 
On-Demand Workers, and then assumed that: (1) 32% of those earnings were 
properly reported, (2) 32% of those earnings were underreported by 30%, and (3) 
36% of the collective earnings went unreported altogether. 
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With respect to the 2.3 million On-Platform Workers identified in the JPMCI 
2018 Study and the 1.6 million On-Platform Workers identified in the 2017 ACW 
Gig Economy Supplement, we assumed that: (1) 68% of On-Demand Workers did 
not receive a Form 1099-K or Form 1099-MISC for their self-employment income, 
and (2) 63% of the population of On-Demand Workers that did not receive any Form 
1099 misreported their income. For the 2019 TIGTA Audit estimate, we used 
812,081 (25%) of the approximately 3.8 million workers who received a Form 1099-
K but did not report income on a Schedule C or Line 21. We then multiplied the 
average SE tax underpayment of $1,542 to those populations to calculate the total 




1) Using SIPP, how many individuals are freelance, independent contractors, 
and self-employed individuals (“Independent Contractors”)?  
2) Using SIPP, how many workers are using on-demand, app-based platforms, 
or are working in occupations that occur in the On-Demand Economy (“On-
Demand Workers”)? 
3) Using SIPP, how much income was earned by Independent Contractors and 
On-Demand Workers? 
4) How much SE tax should have been collected on this income? 
5) What was the Social Security underpayment amount from this income? 
6) What are the Social Security implications for these workers and the solvency 
for Social Security? 
 
About the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
 
To prepare the estimates in this Article, we used the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). SIPP is a longitudinal, multi-
panel survey of adults in the United States. Each panel features a nationally 
representative sample interviewed over a multi-year period lasting approximately 
two and a half to four years. The size of the sample ranges from 14,000 to 52,000 
households. In comparison to other nationally representative surveys, SIPP fills the 
gaps that other surveys such as the Current Population Survey (CPS) leave by 
providing data that affords a better understanding and analyses of the distribution 
of income, wealth, and poverty in the United States and of the effects of federal and 
state programs on the well-being of families and individuals. 
The core questions cover demographic characteristics, labor force 
participation, program participation, and amounts and types of earned and 
unearned income received including transfer payments and noncash benefits from 
various programs and asset ownership. Additionally, SIPP is larger than 
comparable surveys such as the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and provides 
information on business ownership that is not found in surveys such as the SCF. 
With respect to labor and earnings questions, SIPP collects information about 
 
92 Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [9:52 
an individual’s work history from the beginning of the reference year through the 
interview month. Specifically, 
Topics covered include the weeks of employment, amount and type(s) 
of earnings, and business characteristics. For respondents with a 
period time not working, SIPP collects data on the reasons why the 
respondent did not hold a job, and whether the respondent looked for 
work. Basic information about the job such as beginning and ending 
dates, the type of work arrangement, and reason for the job ending 
(when applicable) are collected first. The next questions are 
characteristics of the job/business such as industry, occupation, union 
status, the number of employees, and incorporation status. Next the 
survey asks about the types of earnings the respondent received 
(wage/salary, commission, tips, overtime or bonus), the amounts 
earned, and the number of hours worked per week. Finally, the survey 
asks respondents to report any time they were away from the job 
without pay within the reported job spell. For those periods where the 
respondent was not employed, information is collected about the labor 
force status of the respondent during that period. This includes 
information about why they were not working, unpaid work in a family 
business or farm, time spent on layoff and time spent looking for work. 
The 2014 Panel allows respondents to report detailed information for 
up to seven jobs and up to three periods of time away without pay. 
Respondents may report up to two changes in wage/salary pay rate 




EJB1_JBORSE through EJB7_JBORSE: 
Description: This variable describes the type of work arrangement, whether work 
for an employer, self-employed or other.  
• Universe Description: Respondents who held a job during the reference 
month. 
TJB1_EMPALL through TJB7_EMPALL: 
Description: About how many people are employed by ... at ALL LOCATIONS 
together?  
• Universe Description: Respondents who had a job or a definite work 
arrangement and their employer operated in more than one location during 
the reference period. 
TJB1_EMPB through TJB7_EMPB: 
Description: What is the maximum number of employees, including ..., working for 
... at any given time?  
 
176  SIPP Content, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp/about/sipp-content-
information.html#par_abstract_7 (last updated Apr. 23, 2019).  
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• Universe Description: Respondents who were self-employed during the 
reference period.  
TJB1_OCC through TJB7_OCC: 
Description: Occupation code Universe  
• Description: Respondents who worked for an employer, were self-employed, 
or had another work arrangement. 
 
Despite its advantages, SIPP has its limitations. As with most survey data, 
SIPP data is self-reported, which can be problematic for the reporting of self-
employment, income received from a particular source, and payment of taxes. In 
addition, the SIPP data on self-employment does not specifically identify 
individuals who earn income working with On-Demand Platforms. Instead, we have 
identified individuals with occupations occurring in the On-Demand Economy as 
reflected by their SIPP survey responses. To provide additional context for the SIPP 
data, we also included the most recent data collected in connection with the 2017 
BLS ACW Survey as well as the JPMCI 2018 Study. 
